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Abstract 
The present study took an individual differences approach to understand how peripheral autonomic 
reactivity and interoceptive ability impact variability in individuals’ emotional intensity.  Working 
under the theory of constructed emotion, we anticipated that interoceptive ability would moderate 
autonomic reactivity to predict emotional intensity. After using a heartbeat detection task to 
measure ability to monitor one’s own heart rate, we induced negative affect using the Trier Social 
Stress Test and continuously recorded cardiovascular physiology throughout the task. Through 
hierarchical regression analyses we found that while interoceptive ability significantly predicts 
both general emotional and high arousal negative emotional intensity, neither autonomic reactivity 
nor its interaction with interoceptive ability have a significant relationship with emotional 
intensity. Our findings provide support to the idea that emotions are constructed by applying 
conceptual knowledge to internal and external stimuli, rather than arising from physiological 
responses alone. 
Keywords: emotion, interoception, autonomic reactivity, peripheral physiology, 
constructionism 
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Although the tendency to experience emotions is recognized as a universal human trait, 
there is surprising variability in the types and subjective quality of emotions that people 
experience. For example, in folk psychology, some people seem more “emotional” and experience 
much more intense emotional reactions compared to the calm-and-collected types who are less 
ruffled by life’s events. Despite this folk idea of emotional intensity as an individual difference, in 
scientific literature, this trait is often taken for granted and used in the context of understanding 
other traits (e.g., neuroticism; Verduyn & Brans, 2011) with little research delineating the 
mechanisms behind emotional intensity. 
In affective science, emotional intensity is defined as how extreme, strong, or forceful an 
individual’s emotions tend to be on average (Larsen & Diener, 1987). When comparing 
individuals, one person may have more intense emotions compared to, say, their friend or partner. 
However, while the intensity of emotions differs depending on circumstance, the intensity of any 
given emotion also varies within a single person from experience to experience (Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, Nezlek, Doscche, & Timmermans, 2007). For example, one instance of anger may be 
more intense today than it was last week. One potential mechanism driving differences in 
emotional intensity is differences in robustness of physiological reaction: historical theories hold 
that differences in autonomic reactivity, particularly in sympathetic excitation, drive differences 
in emotional intensity (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962). More recent data suggest that differences 
in ability to detect physiological cues, or interoceptive ability, may also drive these individual 
differences (e.g., Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004). 
 Thus, the goal of the present study is to examine the relative contributions of autonomic 
reactivity (i.e., how substantially one’s autonomic nervous system state during an emotional 
episode differs from one’s autonomic state during a neutral episode) and interoceptive ability in 
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driving emotional intensity. We examine these through the lens of a psychological constructionist 
theory of emotion called the theory of constructed emotion, which views emotional experiences as 
unique instances built from the situated combination of physiology, context, and the meaning made 
of that context. Below, we first review the nature of emotional intensity as a construct and then 
introduce the theory of constructed emotion and its relevant hypotheses for emotional intensity as 
measured in the present study. 
An Individual Differences Approach to Emotional Intensity 
Emotional Intensity 
 An emotional experience can be described in terms of its intensity. Intensity is 
characterized as the subjective experience of how acute, sharp, or strong the emotion feels to the 
experiencer. For example, one might feel intense sadness after the loss of a loved one, but less 
intense sadness after the loss of a famous celebrity (Scherer, 2005). In Russell’s (1980) circumplex 
model of emotion, intensity is defined as distance from a “neutral” origin point along dimensions 
of both arousal, or how activated or deactivated one feels, and valence, or how pleasant or 
unpleasant one feels (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; Scherer, 2005). Following this 
logic, participants can self-report intensity by indicating a score on a continuous scale from some 
minimum to some maximum value, either on a circumplex (e.g., Russell, 1980) or along a Likert-
type scale (e.g., Affect Intensity Measure; Larsen & Diener, 1987). 
Previous literature focuses on intensity of both arousal and valence. For example, intensity 
of physiological arousal is a strong predictor of how intensely emotions are subjectively felt 
(Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Levenson, 2014).  With regard to valenced intensity, individuals’ 
negative versus positive emotions are highly correlated, such that someone who generally reports 
high intensity negative emotions is more likely to also report high intensity positive emotions 
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(Diener et al., 1985). Since these differences appear to be stable over time and also are observable 
in children, previous theories posit that between-individual differences in emotional intensity are 
ultimately driven by personality or temperament (Thomas, Chess, & Birch, 1970). Similarly, 
Larsen and Diener (1987) frame emotional intensity as how relatively weak or strong an 
individual’s emotional experiences typically are compared to other people’s, in response to the 
same degree of emotional stimulus. Thus, prior research has emphasized emotional intensity as a 
trait, which remains the same across circumstances. 
 In this study, we were instead interested in emotion intensity as a state, given that trait 
emotional intensity is likely built upon one’s state emotional intensity. In assessing the emotion 
intensity of a specific emotional experience –a stressful task– we viewed responses as a byproduct 
of individual differences in physiological reactions and interoceptive ability. 
Theory of Constructed Emotion 
 One useful framework for understanding why emotions vary so much between and within 
individuals is the theory of constructed emotion (TCE; Barrett, 2006; Barrett, 2017). In this view, 
emotion and all mental states (e.g., attitudes) are constructed from a large number of more basic, 
domain-general processes that are not themselves exclusive to emotion, such as one’s ongoing 
bodily state (core affect), conceptual knowledge rooted in prior experiences and culture, and 
executive functions such as working memory capacity. The TCE hypothesizes that an emotional 
experience occurs when an individual’s conceptual knowledge of the people, behaviors, objects, 
etc. at hand is applied to the present situation, including the current physiological state. In the 
present study, we focused particularly on how variability in core affect –either due to differences 
in the degree of physiological response or in ability to accurately detect those responses– can create 
individual differences in resultant emotional intensity. 
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 Core affect. Physiological changes are a fundamental, “core” component of an emotional 
experience, in that an individual’s bodily cues serve as information to be interpreted in the 
construction of a resultant emotion (Lindquist, 2013). The two previously described dimensions 
of intensity that vary independently of one another, arousal and valence, are in fact measurable 
qualities of core affect itself (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). These two dimensions are typically 
plotted on a circumplex affect grid, with valence along the horizontal axis and arousal along the 
vertical axis (Russell, 1980). Core affect is thought to be rooted in the body’s physiological 
reactions and forms an aspect of consciousness from birth onwards (Barrett, 2017), though affect 
reactivity is known to vary across individuals, events, and life stages (Russell & Barrett, 1999; 
Timmermans, Van Mechelen, & Nezlek, 2009). Even animals are thought to possess affect, at least 
in a rudimentary form (e.g., Bliss-Moreau, Machado, & Amaral, 2013; see Lindquist, 2013). 
Beyond its role as a building block of emotion, affect is also viewed as a central feature in 
phenomena like prejudice, decision-making, personality, and other areas (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 
2009). This is another example of the basic, more general-use nature of the “building blocks of 
emotion,” rather than those elements being exclusive to emotion itself. 
 Autonomic reactivity. Core affect is grounded in physiology, and the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) is a critical influence on physiological reactions. As such, measuring changes in the 
functions of the cardiovascular system provides insight into a person’s core affective state 
(Bernston, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007). While significant cardiovascular responses to an 
environmental stressor are commonly observed, individuals differ in the degree to which their 
cardiovascular system reacts, according to genetic, epigenetic and psychological factors (e.g., 
some individuals may have developed more reactive autonomic responses influenced in part by 
genetics; Cacioppo, Uchino, & Berntson, 1994; Ottaviani, Shapiro, Davydov, & Goldstein, 2008). 
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When other influences, like posture and nature of the stressor, are held constant, physiological 
indices of cardiovascular activity can serve as a window into the activity of the ANS. Autonomic 
reactivity, or the degree of change in the ANS between a baseline state and a stressful state, is 
thought to be an important cause of emotional experiences (Critchley & Nagai, 2012; Quigley & 
Barrett, 2014). 
Interoceptive ability. In the construction of emotion, a conceptual framework is used to 
filter through and react to information that is gathered from the environment and from the inner 
body (Barrett, 2006). However, contrary to interpretations of older emotion theories that take into 
account autonomic reactions [like the Schachter-Singer (1962) or James-Lange (James, 1884; 
Lange, 1885) theories] humans do not have instantaneous, unbiased access to knowledge about the 
activity in their autonomic nervous or somatic systems. Rather, all information gathered about 
bodily activity is obtained through perception of these physiological responses. In the central 
nervous system, this process begins when the insula receives projections from the spinal cord 
concerning both external and internal sensations, which are then integrated together as a 
representation of the current environment’s meaningful features (Craig, 2011). Past work has 
shown that activity in the anterior insular cortex correlates strongly with subjective, but not 
objective, intensity of stimulus strength (i.e. perceived temperature of cold stimuli, Craig, Chen, 
Bandy, & Reiman, 2000), suggesting that interoception –or the subjective experience of internal 
bodily changes– may occur at least in part in the insula (Craig, 2009). 
However, as with all perceived stimuli, physiological responses will not necessarily be 
perceived accurately (Barrett et al., 2004). An individual’s ability to accurately perceive 
physiological signals is interoceptive ability. Everyone has the capacity for interoception, but 
individuals vary in the accuracy of such judgments (Barrett et al., 2004). There is some evidence 
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that relatively high activity in the anterior insular cortex during an interoceptive task is associated 
with better accuracy (i.e., greater interoceptive ability) on that task (Critchley, Weins, Rotshtein, 
Öhman, & Dolan, 2004). 
Predictions for the Role of Autonomic Reactivity and Interoception on Emotional Intensity  
 Based on the above literature, we hypothesized that ratings of subjective emotional 
intensity of a stressful experience would be driven by a person’s objective degree of autonomic 
reactivity and interoceptive ability. Guided by the theory of constructed emotion, we hypothesized 
that greater degree of autonomic reactivity should correspond to a more intense emotional 
experience. The theory of constructed emotion also suggests that higher interoceptive ability would 
be associated with more intense emotions, as Barrett et al. (2004) found a significant positive 
correlation between interoceptive ability and self-reported arousal. Our third and final hypothesis 
emerged from the idea that at any level of autonomic reactivity, interoceptive ability should serve 
to heighten or dampen the individual’s sense of that physiological response and thus influence how 
physiological response is conceptualized into an emotional experience. In this way, interoceptive 
ability and autonomic reactivity should interact to predict emotional intensity. 
Present Study 
In order to assess the relationship between emotional intensity, autonomic reactivity, and 
interoceptive ability, we measured interoceptive ability in a first session, and then in a follow-up 
session induced negative affect and recorded continuous cardiovascular responses and self-
reported emotional intensity. To measure interoceptive ability, we used a heartbeat detection task 
to determine how well participants could identify their own heartbeats, as accuracy in identifying 
one’s own heartbeats is conceptually associated with overall interoceptive ability (Whitehead, 
Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977; Barrett et al., 2004). We also measured subjective 
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interoceptive ability using a series of questionnaires, including the Multidimensional Assessment 
of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012) and Bodily Awareness Questionnaire 
(BAQ; Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989). To induce negative affect, we used a well-validated task 
shown to provoke psychobiological stress: the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, 
& Hellhammer, 1993). The stress response elicited by the TSST is known to cause cardiovascular 
changes, and we measured autonomic reactivity as the degree of change from baseline experienced 
across the TSST. 
Method 
Participants 
Because we used psychophysiological measures and a stress induction, recruitment 
included stringent exclusion criteria. During prescreening, individuals who reported current mood, 
personality, social anxiety disorders, history of substance abuse including nicotine, a diagnosis of 
a heart condition (e.g., murmur), or presence of a pacemaker were excluded. Additionally, 
individuals with a BMI over 33 were excluded (M = 22.14, SD = 2.41, range: 16.8–28.9), as high 
body fat inhibits accurate cardiography (Frank, Colliver, & Frank, 1986). In addition to in-take 
eligibility, we included session-specific requirements to eliminate physiological confounds: 
individuals could only participate in the present lab visit if they did not consume alcohol, caffeine, 
and excess sugar within three hours prior to arrival, nor eat a heavy meal or engage in strenuous 
exercise within one hour prior.  
The final sample consisted of 61 undergraduate students (52.5% white; 52.5% female; Mage 
= 19.26 years, SDage = 1.40). Participants from the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience’s 
participant pool received class credit for participation. Prior to analysis, 10 participants were 
excluded due to tasks irregularities (i.e. only one interviewer; n = 4), guessing study hypotheses 
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or learning them from other participants (n = 2), violations of eligibility requirements revealed 
after participation had begun (e.g., drank a strongly caffeinated drink right before the study; n = 
2), participant familiarity with the researchers (n = 1), and poor fluency in English (n = 1). 
Procedure 
 Participants completed two separate sessions, each at least one week but no more than one 
month apart. In Session 1, participants completed a heartbeat detection task as a measure of their 
interoceptive ability and several questionnaires. In Session 2, participants underwent the Trier 
Social Stress Test (TSST) to induce a robust high arousal, negative emotional state and to assess 
continuous measures of physiological reactivity.   
Session 1. The experimenter wore a laboratory coat and greeted each participant upon 
arrival. All participants completed a Daily Health Inventory questionnaire regarding food and 
caffeine intake and recent exercise that might disqualify the individual from participating that day. 
(Participants disqualified in this manner were rescheduled.) After ensuring individuals had 
followed our instructions for participating, we obtained informed consent and proceeded with 
session tasks. Participants first completed 5 minutes of physiological baseline in which 
electrocardiogram (ECG) was continuously measured. After baseline, the next tasks were 
counterbalanced to avoid order effects: participants first completed either the heartbeat detection 
task or a questionnaire block. The questionnaire block included the Multidimensional Assessment 
of Interoceptive Awareness and Body Awareness Questionnaires as indices of self-reported 
interoceptive ability, the Common Mental Disorders Questionnaire to identify individuals with 
somatization tendencies, and other measures not pertinent to this report. The order of 
questionnaires and questionnaire items were randomized.  
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY  12 
 
Session 2. Like Session 1, the experimenter wore a laboratory coat and greeted each 
participant upon arrival. All participants completed a Daily Health Inventory questionnaire 
regarding food and caffeine intake and recent exercise that might disqualify the individual from 
participating that day. After ensuring individuals had followed our instructions for participating, 
we prepared individuals for peripheral physiological data collection by attaching sensors. 
Participants then completed 5 minutes of physiological baseline in which ECG, cardiac impedance, 
and blood pressure were continuously recorded. For more information on the utilized 
cardiovascular indices, see Psychophysiological measures below. 
Trier Social Stress Test. The TSST is a standard task for inducing interpersonal stress and 
physiological responsivity to stress (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). After baseline, participants 
consented to participate in the TSST. The experimenter introduced the task as an assessment of 
individuals’ cognitive performance under pressure, as relevant for future job prospects. Following 
consent, two interviewers entered the room and explained the task. The interviewers were 
instructed to remain as affectively neutral as possible throughout the duration of the TSST. As per 
Akinola and Mendes (2008) and Kubzanzky et al. (2012), the TSST consisted of three main 
periods: the speech preparation period (2 minutes), the speech (10 minutes), and an impromptu 
mental arithmetic task (5 minutes). 
During the preparation period, individuals sat alone while mentally preparing (i.e. without 
the use of pen and paper) for the speech; this period provided an opportunity for us to capture 
initial anticipatory stress. After preparation, the interviewers reentered the room and instructed the 
participant to begin the speech task, which was to give a continuous speech detailing a personal 
“dream job” and past experience, strengths, weaknesses, etc. relevant to the participant’s chosen 
career. Throughout the speech, the interviewers pretended to take detailed notes and provided 
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verbal prods when the participant paused for more than a few seconds. If the participant stopped 
talking completely, the interviewers used a series of “follow-up questions” to ensure the participant 
remained engaged in the task throughout the full 10 minutes.        
After the speech, the interviewers introduced a mental arithmetic task, of which 
participants had not previously been aware. In this segment, participants were asked to count 
backwards from a large number and were required to start over after every mistake. For the initial 
version of the task, participants counted backwards from 996 in steps of 7 and restarted from 996 
following each mistake. If participants completed the initial task too easily, the interviewers 
interrupted and modified the task, instructing the participant to count back from 2043 in steps of 
17. If participants struggled to complete the initial task at a regular pace, the interviewers 
interrupted and modified the task, instructing the participant to count back from 943 in steps of 5. 
The participant performed the mental arithmetic task in the appropriate version for 5 minutes, 
though interviewers did not explain in the introduction that the task was time limited (i.e. the 
participant would not be required to count all the way to 0). 
After the math task, participants sat alone for a 5-minute recovery period, allowing us to 
assess how quickly individuals recovered to baseline from the stressor. Psychophysiological data 
was recorded for the duration of the baseline, preparation, interview, arithmetic, and recovery 
periods. During recovery, participants completed questionnaires about their thoughts and feelings 
during the TSST. These questionnaires provided measures of subjective emotional intensity for 
this report’s primary hypothesis-testing– as well as somatic intensity as an exploratory addition. 
As deception was used in this study and as the TSST could have potentially caused 
psychological distress, all participants were debriefed on the purpose of the study. First, we queried 
participants about their thoughts on the hypotheses of the experiment, the involved task, and the 
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authenticity of the psychophysiological equipment through a funneled debriefing administered by 
a research assistant. Second, participants received a debriefing form explaining the study 
hypotheses and procedure, particularly that the TSST was intended as a psychological stress task, 
rather than a measure of cognitive performance, and that the “trained” interviewers were actually 
actors. It also gave a brief explanation of our hypotheses– until this point the study had been 
portrayed as an experiment investigating physiology and cognition, rather than emotion. Lastly, 
participants received details about University-sponsored counseling services available to research 
participants, so that they could obtain counseling if they experienced lasting stress related to our 
study. 
Session 1 Measures  
 Heartbeat detection task. As an objective measure of interoceptive ability, participants 
completed the modified Whitehead heartbeat detection task (Kleckner, Wormwood, Simmons, 
Barrett, & Quigley, 2015; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977).  In this task, each 
participant was attached to electrocardiography sensors (ECG) as described above, and his or her 
heartbeat was measured for a 5-minute baseline period. After this, a MATLAB program was used 
to administer tones based on the timing of ventricular contraction (i.e. the R spike), as determined 
from an amplitude threshold calculated during baseline. The tones either coincided with (200 ms 
after the R spike) or did not coincide with (500 ms after the R spike) the participant’s heartbeat. 
Each trial consisted of 10 tones, after which participants were asked to identify whether or not the 
tones for that trial had corresponded with heartbeat, as well as how confident they were in their 
responses. 
The task uses signal detection theory to account for sensitivity rooted in how many hits, 
misses, false alarms, and correct rejections an individual makes for detecting their actual heartbeats 
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(Barrett et al., 2004; Banks, 1970).  Several studies on interoceptive ability have used the Schandry 
(1981) task instead: individuals simply count how many times their heart beats during one minute. 
However, accuracy on the Schandry task is likely improved if the individual is familiar with how 
many times his or her heart beats on average per minute (e.g., individuals who exercise, work in 
healthcare, use FitBits or smart watches, etc.), and thus may be a less objective measure of 
interoceptive ability. Participants completed 2 practice trials and 60 experimental trials, following 
previously established methodological recommendations for number of trials necessary to 
establish sufficient statistical power (Kleckner et al., 2015).  
Interoceptive ability questionnaires. In addition to using an objective measure of 
interoceptive ability –the heartbeat detection task– we also collected self-report data on perceived 
interoceptive ability during Session 1. This allowed us to analyze the relationship between 
perceived versus actual interoceptive ability, as well as the interplay between these measures and 
emotion complexity. We primarily chose measures that were developed in an effort to measure 
awareness of bodily sensations in a neutral light, rather than those aimed at the negatively-
connoted somatic symptom reporting or exaggeration trait. 
 Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA). This scale was 
originally validated using participants who had received extensive training in fields assumed to be 
related to the target construct of bodily awareness, like yoga, meditation, and mindfulness 
(Mehling et al., 2012). Using 32 items rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale, the MAIA produces 
eight subscores indicating awareness of bodily sensation (noticing), acceptance of uncomfortable 
sensation (not-distracting), lack of emotional distress related to discomfort (not-worrying), ability 
to control bodily awareness (attention regulation), connections made between bodily sensation 
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and emotion (emotional awareness), stress regulation (self-regulation), attending to the body as a 
source of insight (body listening), and view of the body as trustworthy (trusting).  
 Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ). Shields et al. (1989) developed this scale as an 
alternative to previous questionnaires that focused only on bodily sensations associated with 
emotion, in favor of examining “the domain of reported awareness of normal body processes not 
typically associated with emotion or with somatic complaint” (p. 803). This measure ensured that 
we were measuring general interoceptive ability, rather than simply symptom reporting or related 
psychopathology. The BAQ is useful for this purpose, as the results of its validation sample 
showed no significant correlation between BAQ score and previously established measures of 
hypochondriasis, trait anxiety, trait neuroticism, or self-esteem (Shields et al., 1989). It consists of 
18 first-person statements regarding exercise, hunger, and normal bodily states that the participant 
rates on a Likert-type scale from 1 (“not at all true of me”) to 7 (“very true of me”). 
 Common Mental Disorders – Screening Questionnaire (CMD-SQ). In an effort to 
identify individuals who might have somatization tendencies, we used the CMD-SQ, a 
questionnaire commonly used to assess how likely an individual is to somaticize their 
psychological distress, i.e. interpret distress as physiological symptoms (Christensen et al., 2005; 
Sogaard & Bech, 2009).  
Session 2 Measures 
Psychophysiological measures. In Session 2, ECG, cardiac impedance, and blood 
pressure were recorded continuously for a 5-minute baseline, throughout the duration of the Trier, 
and for a 5-minute recovery period. All psychophysiological measures were obtained using BioLab 
acquisition software from MindWare Technologies (Columbus, OH). ECG was used to measure 
heart rate (HR) and the inter-beat interval (IBI) between heart beats. ECG was also used in Session 
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1, but only for the purposes of conducting the heartbeat detection task; the ECG data from Session 
1 was not included in the present paper’s analyses. Additionally, cardiac impedance was used to 
measure respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), cardiac output (CO), stroke volume (SV), left 
ventricular ejection time (LVET), and pre-ejection period (PEP) as indices of how much blood is 
being pumped to the periphery, versus conserved in the core. Finally, as a measure of vasodilation 
or vasoconstriction in blood vessels as blood is pumped to the periphery, we continuously collected 
diastolic pressure, systolic pressure, and total peripheral resistance (TPR). However, for the 
purposes of this report, blood pressure was not analyzed.  
 Post-TSST questionnaires. These questionnaires, administered in the second session, 
aimed to capture the participant’s experience during the TSST, in terms of both emotional and 
physiological response.   
Emotions questionnaire. Participants described their emotions on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale (anchored at 0, “not at all,” and 6, “extremely”) that asked them to indicate “to what extent” 
they felt each of 30 emotional or affective states “during the speech and math task you just 
completed.” The labels for the states were drawn from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
Circumplex (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Somatic sensations questionnaire. Participants also self-reported intensity of 42 bodily 
sensations on a Likert-type scale from 0 (felt “not at all” intensely) to 6 (felt “extremely” 
intensely). These sensations were divided across cardiac changes (e.g., “heart palpitations”), 
gastric changes (e.g., “pit in your stomach”), respiratory changes (e.g., “rapid or difficulty 
breathing”), kinesthetic changes (e.g., “body or limbs feeling heavy”), temperature changes (e.g., 
“flushed or hot”), and arousal state changes (e.g., “energized,” “weariness”). These data allowed 
us to explore the range and type of physiological sensations participants believed themselves to 
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have experienced during the TSST– and also compare them to actual physiological data obtained 
during the task. 
Results 
In our analyses we addressed the role of peripheral physiological responses and 
interoceptive ability on the subjective intensity of emotional self-reports. Prior research suggests 
that more intense physiological reactions predict greater emotional intensity (Levenson, 2014; 
Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Mendes, 2016). However, we hypothesized that interoceptive ability 
would interact with physiological reactivity to predict emotional intensity, and also that 
interoception would account for some of the variability in emotional intensity even beyond this 
interaction alone.  
First, we calculated descriptive statistics for all variables to ensure that our measures were 
normally distributed and did not exhibit skew or kurtosis. Next, we conducted hypothesis testing 
using hierarchical regressions to assess the relative contributions of interoceptive ability and 
physiological reactivity on the intensity of all emotion items, as well as on the intensity of the 
emotions marked high arousal and negative according to Table 1. Finally, as exploratory analyses, 
we examined the relationship between the other individual differences (e.g., self-reported 
interoceptive ability, somatization tendencies, etc.) and interoceptive ability and physiological 
reactivity. We then ran hierarchical regressions replicating the primary hypothesis-testing models, 
but with overall somatic intensity as the outcome of interest.   
Descriptive Statistics  
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and frequencies for each emotion and somatic 
sensation are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. In general, participants reported relatively 
high levels of high arousal, negative emotions, like “stressed,” “anxious,” and “frustrated” (Ms = 
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4.02, 3.91, 3.64). In contrast, participants indicated that they felt low arousal emotions, including 
“sad”, “quiet”, and “sleepy”, with much less intensity (Ms = 1.24, 1.60, 1.89). This suggests that 
the TSST was effective at inducing the intended high arousal, negative state. In terms of somatic 
intensity, participants more strongly felt sensations like “heart rate increased,” “fidgety,” and 
“wide awake” (Ms = 3.84, 3.47, 3.42) than sensations like “faint,” “pale,” or “weak” (Ms = 1.22, 
1.27, 1.38). These data show that high arousal somatic sensations were more characteristic of 
participant experience during the TSST than were low arousal somatic sensations. Also notably, 
somatic intensity (M = 1.89) was on average lower than emotional intensity (M = 2.52). Further, 
participants reported greater intensity of high arousal, negative emotions (M = 2.78) than of 
emotions in general (M = 2.52), as shown in Table 3, which may mean the TSST was likely 
construed more in terms of emotion than mere somatic changes. 
 With regards to average physiological reactions during the TSST, participants tended to 
experience lowest physiological arousal during baseline and peak changes during the prep and 
math periods of the TSST (e.g., heart rate change from baseline Mspeech = 14.79 increased beats per 
minute, SDspeech = 10.19). See Table 4 for mean change descriptives from baseline of all peripheral 
physiological indices at each of the other four time points (prep, speech, math, and recovery), as 
well as mean reactivity across the TSST as a whole. 
Additionally, the distribution of heartbeat detection task scores demonstrated that most 
(66.67%) of participants performed at a better-than-chance accuracy rate.  On average, participants 
were 57.8% accurate (SD = 13.2), though scores included a wide range of poor (min = 36.7) to 
good (max = 91.7) performance. See Table 5 for a more specific breakdown of the distribution of 
participant heartbeat detection task scores. 
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Hypothesis Testing 
 We ran two overarching hierarchical regression models to test our hypotheses on the roles 
played by interoceptive ability and physiological reactivity in predicting emotional intensity during 
the TSST. Each physiological index was run in its own model as a predictor, alongside 
interoceptive ability and the interaction effect between the two. Table 6 lists results for both steps 
of the analysis for each outcome variable predicting overall emotional intensity; Table 7 lists 
results for high arousal, negative emotion intensity models. 
Model A: Interoceptive ability + Physiological reactivity + (Interoceptive ability X 
Physiological reactivity), on Overall emotional intensity. This model is summarized in Table 6. 
In general, when interoceptive ability was run in Step A1 as the only predictor, it was significant 
(ps < .01). In the Step A2 models, it remained the only significant predictor (ps < .05), despite the 
addition of each physiological reactivity index (e.g., HR) and the interaction between that index 
and interoceptive ability (ps > .25). Changes in R2 between A1 and A2 were minimal, as well. That 
is, the A2 models including each physiological reactivity index did not predict the variance in 
overall emotional intensity during the TSST better than the A1 model with interoceptive ability 
alone as a predictor. The only exceptions to this pattern were two indices, HR and IBI, for which 
interoceptive ability became nonsignificant in Step A2 (p = .190, .197). 
Model B: Interoceptive ability + Physiological reactivity + (Interoceptive ability X 
Physiological reactivity), on High arousal, negative emotional intensity. The results for Model 
B, shown in Table 7, were similar to those seen in Model A. In Step B1, interoceptive ability was 
a significant predictor of high arousal, negative emotional intensity (ps < .01). In Step B2, 
interoceptive ability was still a significant but sometimes marginal predictor (ps < 0.10), while the 
main effect of each physiological reactivity index and the interaction between the two were 
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nonsignificant (ps > .50). Again, entering a given physiological reactivity index and the interaction 
effect between physiological reactivity and interoceptive ability did not produce a better model of 
high arousal, negative emotion intensity than the model using interoceptive ability alone.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 Additionally, two sets of exploratory analyses were conducted. Questionnaire descriptive 
statistics are in Table 8. In Table 9, we present bivariate correlations between all study variables: 
interoceptive ability; questionnaire measures; physiological reactivity indices; overall emotional 
intensity; high arousal, negative emotional intensity; somatic intensity. 
 Questionnaires. There was a significant, moderately strong positive relationship between 
scores on the MAIA and BAQ, likely since both questionnaires measure similar constructs (r = 
.459; p < 0.001). We also observed significant positive relationships between CMD-SQ score and 
self-report of overall emotional (r = .417, p = .004), high arousal, negative emotional (r = .298, p 
= .047), and somatic intensity (r = .384, p = .009) during the TSST; this could indicate that 
individuals with greater somatization tendencies were also more likely to experience greater 
intensity emotions and somatic sensations. However, the mean score on the CMD-SQ fails to meet 
the cut-off values for likelihood of psychopathological symptom reporting or illness worry 
(Christensen et al., 2005), suggesting our sample in general did not show clinical levels of these 
symptoms. Interestingly, the heartbeat detection score did not significantly correlate with either 
measure of self-reported interoceptive ability (MAIA: r = -.194, p = .160; BAQ: r = -.204, p = 
.139). These findings suggest that a person’s subjective report that he or she is highly aware of and 
sensitive to bodily changes does not necessarily mean that person will be objectively accurate at 
detecting those changes. 
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 Somatic intensity. We were also interested in how interoceptive ability and physiological 
reactivity might impact mean reports of overall somatic intensity. To investigate this, we ran 
hierarchical regressions replicating our primary models of interest with somatic intensity as the 
outcome. However, no models proved significant. These findings are displayed in Table 10.  
Discussion 
 Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that interoceptive ability is a significant predictor 
of subjective emotional intensity, regardless of actual physiological reactivity in the autonomic 
nervous system. The relationship between interoceptive ability, as measured in a heartbeat 
detection task, and emotional intensity, as self-reported, remained significant even after accounting 
for actual physiological response in the cardiovascular system and the interaction between this 
response and interoceptive ability. This evidence suggests that interoceptive ability as an 
individual difference may be an even more important mechanism driving perceived emotional 
intensity than how strongly the autonomic nervous system responds. 
The non-significance of the relationship between physiological reactivity and emotional 
intensity demonstrates that there is not a one-to-one relationship between a given physiological 
reaction and an emotional response, considering that the majority of the variance in emotional 
intensity was not explained by cardiovascular activity alone. In each physiological index’s 
hierarchical regression, the model with physiological reactivity alongside interoceptive ability was 
only slightly better at predicting changes in emotional intensity than the model with interoceptive 
ability by itself, indicating that interoceptive ability was much more central to emotion than was 
physiological reactivity. Interoceptive ability likely represents how much peripheral bodily signals 
are being received and refined by the brain, so individuals with greater interoceptive ability are 
afforded more opportunity to make meaning of those bodily signals as, say, an emotion. 
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Considering this, our findings suggest that peripheral indices, like the cardiovascular reactivity 
used as a measure of physiological response in this study, may be insufficient for predicting 
emotional intensity. Individual differences like interoceptive ability may impact how much these 
bodily signals are actually received and used by the brain for mental state construction. Thus, taken 
together, our results lend support to the theory of constructed emotion, by suggesting that 
emotional experiences have their roots in more than peripheral physiological changes, but also in 
how the brain integrates those changes into conscious awareness to construct emotion (e.g., Chanes 
& Barrett, 2016). 
 Although many studies investigate the relationship between emotion and peripheral 
physiology, this study incorporated interoceptive ability as a predictor of emotional intensity, 
setting it apart from similar studies that failed to account for interoceptive differences. This study 
demonstrated the importance of including interoceptive ability in any study that assesses the 
relation between peripheral physiology and emotion experience. Our findings are all the more 
interesting insofar as interoceptive ability was measured between a week and a month in advance 
of the physiological recordings. Thus, it is unlikely that priming participants to pay attention to 
their body states influenced the relationship between interoception and the intensity of emotional 
self-reports. We were also careful to accurately measure physiological reactivity in relation to the 
negative affect induction. Our stringent exclusion criteria ensured that the measured physiological 
reactions were tied to the stressful task itself, rather than merely reflecting an altered 
cardiovascular state brought on by, for example, caffeine consumption shortly before the study. 
Additionally, human review of the initial computer-generated physiological data coding helped 
make certain physiological reactivity was properly quantified before being analyzed. Further, as 
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we excluded individuals who reported relevant psychopathy, our findings are generalizable to the 
population of non-clinical young adults as a whole. 
 Additionally, the apparent significance of interoceptive ability in constructing an emotional 
experience has key implications for clinical psychology. In a review, Domschke et al. (2010) found 
that people with clinical levels of anxiety tend to perform more accurately on tasks investigating 
cardiovascular interoceptive ability. Greater interoceptive ability was shown by this study to be 
associated with greater emotional intensity, so it makes sense that individuals with anxiety 
disorders, which are characterized in part by excessive emotional response and distress (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), would demonstrate greater interoceptive ability. Contrastingly, 
individuals with anorexia nervosa exhibit significantly decreased scores on heartbeat counting 
tasks (Pollatos et al., 2008) and decreased insular activity when focusing on gastric sensations 
(Kerr et al., 2016), which may help explain these individuals’ difficulty in attending to hunger and 
satiety cues. Further work on the interoceptive differences between individuals with anxiety or 
anorexia and their healthy counterparts can help expand on these findings and possibly provide 
valuable insight into effective treatment paradigms for these disorders. 
 However, our results are not without caveats. We only used one index of interoceptive 
ability, cardiac awareness, as we were measuring cardiovascular reactivity; however, cardiac 
awareness may only be one facet of interoceptive ability and as such, future work should 
investigate other domains of interoception, such as gastric awareness, in relation to emotional 
intensity. Future work should explore the neural underpinnings of physiological reactivity and 
interoception in emotion experience, especially as they relate to core affect in the context of the 
theory of construction emotion. Understanding the neural mechanisms might shed further light on 
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the peripheral versus central nervous system mechanisms that drive the embodied experience of 
emotion. 
 In conclusion, we found evidence that interoceptive ability significantly impacts perceived 
emotional intensity above and beyond physiological reactivity; this insight brings us one step 
closer to understanding the nature and construction of emotion. As emotion is central in human 
experience, a research program further assessing how interoception plays a role in emotion will 
help further reveal how the body shapes our emotions– and minds more generally.  
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Table 1. Self-reported emotional intensity descriptive statistics. This table contains data from 45 
participants. 
 
 Affect    
Emotion Valence Arousal M SD Range 
Afraid – + 2.20 1.53 1–6 
Angry – + 1.87 1.49 1–7 
Annoyed – + 3.44 2.08 1–7 
Anxious – + 3.91 1.83 1–7 
Disgusted – + 3.04 1.61 1–6 
Distressed – + 3.04 1.61 1–6 
Embarrassed – + 2.98 1.88 1–7 
Frustrated – + 3.64 1.76 1–7 
Guilty – + 1.56 1.16 1–5 
Hyperactive – + 2.33 1.55 1–6 
Irritable – + 2.60 1.83 1–6 
Panicky – + 2.96 1.61 1–7 
Stressed – + 4.02 1.78 1–7 
Bored – – 2.36 1.86 1–7 
Sad – – 1.24 0.65 1–6 
Unhappy – – 2.33 1.85 1–7 
Weary – – 2.29 1.39 1–5 
Activated  + 3.71 1.70 1–7 
Alert  + 3.91 1.70 1–7 
Calm  – 2.58 1.25 1–5 
Quiet  – 1.60 1.25 1–6 
Sleepy  – 1.89 1.30 1–6 
Excited + + 2.22 1.24 1–5 
Proud + + 2.22 1.28 1–6 
Content + – 2.02 1.14 1–5 
Relaxed + – 2.22 1.24 1–5 
Amused +  2.38 1.50 1–6 
Happy +  1.98 1.22 1–6 
Interested +  2.78 1.52 1–6 
Pleased +  1.89 1.13 1–5 
Note: For valence, + indicates “positive” and – indicates “negative.” For arousal, + indicates “high” and – 
indicates “low.” No symbol indicates “neutral” for both dimensions. For all emotions, potential range was 
from 1 to 7. 
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Table 2. Self-reported somatic intensity descriptive statistics. This table contains data from 45 
participants. 
 
Sensation M SD Range 
Cardiac Sensations 
Blood pumping 3.18 1.81 1–6 
Heart palpitations 1.56 1.22 1–6 
Heart pounding in chest 2.49 1.78 1–7 
Heart rate increased 3.84 1.88 1–7 
Throbbing 1.53 1.20 1–7 
 
Gastric Sensations 
Butterflies in stomach 2.33 1.55 1–6 
Feeling empty or hollow 1.24 0.71 1–4 
Nausea or queasiness 1.13 0.63 1–5 
Pit in your stomach 1.76 1.38 1–7 
Sick 1.13 0.34 1–2 
Stomach tense 1.84 1.48 1–7 
 
Kinesthetic Sensations 
Body or limbs feeling heavy 1.36 0.77 1–5 
Dizzy or light-headed 1.47 1.01 1–6 
Feeling fidgety 3.47 1.90 1–7 
Feeling still or frozen 1.87 1.31 1–7 
Head aching 1.07 0.33 1–3 
Jittery 3.02 1.69 1–7 
Knots / tension 1.96 1.41 1–6 
Numbness 1.31 0.73 1–4 
Pain 1.04 0.21 1–2 
Shakiness or trembling 2.40 1.72 1–7 
Shivering 1.29 0.76 1–5 
Spine tingling 1.07 0.33 1–3 
Tingling in your limbs or fingers 1.64 1.00 1–5 
 
Respiratory Sensations 
Rapid or difficulty breathing 1.24 0.91 1–6 
Tightness in chest 1.73 1.34 1–7 
 
Temperature Sensations 
Blood draining out of your face (turning pale) 1.27 0.62 1–4 
Face or neck turned red 1.69 1.28 1–7 
Feeling cold or clammy 2.00 1.62 1–7 
Flushed or hot 1.96 1.36 1–7 
Skin or scalp prickling (goosebumps) 1.33 0.85 1–4 
Sweating increased 2.64 2.07 1–7 
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Arousal Sensations 
Drained 1.91 1.18 1–5 
Energized 2.64 1.65 1–6 
Exhausted 1.87 1.18 1–5 
Feeling faint 1.22 0.88 1–6 
Feeling physically strong / powerful 1.78 1.15 1–5 
Feeling physically weak 1.38 0.96 1–5 
Restless 2.87 1.82 1–7 
Sluggish 1.58 0.94 1–5 
Weariness 1.98 1.34 1–7 
Wide awake 3.42 1.76 1–7 
Note: For all somatic sensations, potential range was from 1 to 7. 
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Table 3. Self-reported intensity descriptive statistics. This table contains data from 45 participants. 
Measure M SD Range 
Overall emotion intensity 2.52 0.59 1.50–3.77 
High arousal, negative emotion intensity 2.78 1.04 1.23–5.15 
Somatic intensity 1.89 0.58 1.00–3.40 
Note: For all emotions, potential range was from 1 to 7.
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY  30 
 
Table 4. Physiological reactivity descriptive statistics. The mean difference from baseline state for each physiological index is shown in this 
table. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The measures in this table are calculated from between 34 to 37 participants, depending on data 
missing at random. 
 Trier Social Stress Test  
Index Mean Prep Speech Math Recovery 
HR 9.54 (7.29) 10.35 (8.82) 14.79 (10.19) 11.24 (10.01) 1.78 (5.61) 
IBI -96.99 (68.22) -105.75 (82.02) -144.38 (90.90) -112.32 (87.11) -25.52 (67.14) 
RSA 0.19 (0.71) 0.36 (0.96) 0.10 (0.88) 0.31 (1.03) -0.01 (0.54) 
CO 2.37 (3.64) 3.47 (8.40) 3.05 (3.53) 2.70 (3.43) -0.35 (2.84) 
LVET 4.76 (22.02) 3.47 (27.35) 6.84 (28.61) 3.46 (25.45) 5.52 (26.17) 
PEP -16.60 (17.19) -19.36 (22.49) -18.77 (19.69) -18.78 (19.41) -7.70 (15.12) 
SV 6.66 (36.70) 16.64 (89.86) 5.94 (49.09) 7.49 (34.81) -6.61 (38.40) 
Note: All measures are per minute. HR is heart rate; IBI is inter-beat interval; RSA is respiratory sinus arrhythmia; CO is cardiac output; LVET is 
left ventricular ejection time; PEP is pre-ejection period; SV is stroke volume.
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Table 5. Heartbeat detection task score frequencies. This table contains data from 54 participants. 
Measure n Percentage 
25.1%–50% accuracy 18 33.33% 
50.1%–75% accuracy 30 55.56% 
75.1%–100% accuracy 6 11.11% 
Note: Actual range was 36.7% to 91.7%. Potential range was 0% to 100%.
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Table 6. Model A: Hypothesis testing of physiological reactivity and interoceptive ability as predictors of overall emotional intensity, using 
hierarchical regression analyses. 
  Physiological reactivity index 
  HR IBI RSA CO LVET PEP SV 
Predictor  b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Step 1               
        HBD 1.954* 0.641 1.365* 0.641 1.954* 0.641 2.152* 0.642 2.152* 0.642 2.152* 0.642 2.152* 0.642 
Step 2               
        HBD 1.442 1.073 1.527 1.152 1.935* 0.651 1.762† 0.759 2.233* 0.665 1.922† 0.903 2.104* 0.689 
        Physio reactivity -0.012 0.056 0.000 0.006 -0.317 0.680 -0.188 0.191 -0.001 0.020 -0.003 0.022 0.005 0.024 
        HBD x Physio 0.049 0.089 -0.004 0.010 0.187 1.026 0.351 0.330 -0.004 0.030 -0.004 0.035 -0.010 0.043 
ΔR2 .069  .078  .059  .037  .021  .034  .004  
Note: For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection task score. For physiological reactivity indices, HR is heart rate; IBI is 
inter-beat interval; RSA is respiratory sinus arrhythmia; CO is cardiac output; LVET is left ventricular ejection time; PEP is pre-ejection period; 
SV is stroke volume. 
* p < 0.01 † p < 0.05 ‡ p < 0.10 
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Table 7. Model B: Hypothesis testing of physiological reactivity and interoceptive ability as predictors of high arousal, negative emotional 
intensity, using hierarchical regression analyses. 
  Physiological reactivity index 
  HR IBI RSA CO LVET PEP SV 
Predictor  b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Step 1               
       HBD 3.969* 1.138 3.969* 1.138 3.969* 1.138 4.100* 1.179 4.100* 1.179 4.100* 1.179 4.100* 1.179 
Step 2               
       HBD 3.466‡ 1.979 3.923‡ 2.126 3.841* 1.195 3.621† 1.421 4.097* 1.240 3.580† 1.674 4.147* 1.261 
       Physio reactivity -0.016 0.103 -0.002 0.011 -0.755 1.249 -0.232 0.357 0.005 0.038 0.002 0.041 -0.011 0.044 
       HBD x Physio 0.049 0.163 -0.001 0.019 1.052 1.882 0.400 0.617 -0.006 0.056 -0.017 0.064 0.016 0.080 
ΔR2 .014  .023  .010  .011  .001  .020  .008  
Note: For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection task score. For physiological reactivity indices, HR is heart rate; IBI is 
inter-beat interval; RSA is respiratory sinus arrhythmia; CO is cardiac output; LVET is left ventricular ejection time; PEP is pre-ejection period; 
SV is stroke volume. 
* p < 0.01 † p < 0.05 ‡ p < 0.10
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Table 8. Questionnaire descriptive statistics. This table contains data from 61 participants. 
Measure M SD Range 
MAIA    
    Overall 3.69 0.55 2.03–5.16 
    Noticing 3.83 0.93 1.25–6.00 
    Not distracting 3.07 0.97 1.00–5.33 
    Not worrying 3.84 0.88 1.33–5.67 
    Attention regulation 3.55 0.79 1.43–5.86 
    Emotional awareness 3.98 0.94 1.80–6.00 
    Self-regulation 3.54 0.94 1.25–5.75 
    Body listening 3.01 1.02 1.00–5.67 
    Trusting 4.52 0.91 2.00–6.00 
    
BAQ 3.97 0.85 2.39–5.67 
    
CMD-SQ 1.45 0.46 1.00–3.53 
Note: For the MAIA, potential range was from 1 to 6. For the BAQ, potential range was from 1 to 7. For 
the CMD-SQ, potential range was from 1 to 5.
Running head: EMOTIONAL INTENSITY  36 
 
Table 9. Bivariate correlations of study variables.   
 Interoceptive ability Physiological reactivity TSST self-report 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Interoceptive ability              
         1. HBD -.194 -.204 -.012 .033 -.031 .008 -.077 .123 -.212 -.030 .373† .385† .253 
         2. MAIA – .459* .052 -.032 -.135 -.257 .076 .230 -.202 -.162 -.135 -.229 -.222 
         3. BAQ  – .150 .135 -.104 -.339† .064 .122 -.241 -.143 -.134 -.323† -.116 
         4. CMD-SQ   – .018 -.131 -.278 -.071 -.178 .066 -.126 .417* .298† .384* 
Physiological reactivity              
         5. HR    – -.915* -.521* .464* -.529* -.314 .006 .235 .084 .310 
         6. IBI     – .517* -.348† .421† .316 .064 -.193 -.076 -0.259 
         7. RSA      – -.348† .000 .260 .067 -.249 -.032 -.070 
         8. CO       – -.054 -.323 .798* .003 -.076 .297 
         9. LVET        – -.201 .079 -.064 .089 -.168 
        10. PEP         – -.136 -.227 -.219 -.067 
        11. SV          – -.116 -.092 .235 
TSST self-report              
        12. Emo intensity           – .879* .696* 
        13. HANE intensity            – .700* 
        14. Somatic intensity             – 
Note: For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection task score; MAIA is Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive 
Awareness; BAQ is Body Awareness Questionnaire; CMD-SQ is Common Mental Disorders – Screening Questionnaire. For physiological 
reactivity indices, HR is heart rate; IBI is inter-beat interval; RSA is respiratory sinus arrhythmia; CO is cardiac output; LVET is left ventricular 
ejection time; PEP is pre-ejection period; SV is stroke volume. For TSST self-report measures, emo intensity is emotional intensity; HANE 
intensity is high arousal, negative emotion intensity. 
* p < 0.01 † p < 0.05 
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Table 10. Hypothesis testing of physiological reactivity and interoceptive ability as predictors of somatic intensity, using hierarchical 
regression analyses. 
  Physiological reactivity index 
  HR IBI RSA CO LVET PEP SV 
Predictor  b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Step 1               
   HBD 1.262 0.798 1.262 0.798 1.262 0.798 1.454‡ 0.812 1.454‡ 0.812 1.454‡ 0.812 1.454‡ 0.812 
Step 2               
   HBD 0.152 1.313 0.194 1.429 1.149 0.834 1.191 0.928 1.630‡ 0.822 1.910 1.163 1.548‡ 0.844 
   Physio reactivity -
0.044 
0.069 0.004 0.008 -
0.673 
0.871 -0.127 0.233 0.008 0.025 -0.015 0.028 -0.004 0.030 
   HBD x Physio 0.109 0.108 -
0.011 
0.012 0.934 1.313 0.307 0.403 -0.022 0.037 0.025 0.045 0.015 0.053 
ΔR2 .113  .102  .023  .103  .066  .011  .059  
Note: For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection task score. For physiological reactivity indices, HR is heart rate; IBI is 
inter-beat interval; RSA is respiratory sinus arrhythmia; CO is cardiac output; LVET is left ventricular ejection time; PEP is pre-ejection period; 
SV is stroke volume. 
* p < 0.01 † p < 0.05 ‡ p < 0.10 
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